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BEYOND THE EITC: THE EFFECT OF REDUCING  
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT  
ON LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Jeremy G. Moulton, Alexandra Graddy-Reed, and Lauren Lanahan
We examine variation in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program when 
households lose eligibility due to children aging out of the program. This change 
in eligibility offers a framework for assessing whether the aim of the program of 
increasing work incentives extends beyond the time recipients qualify for the EITC. 
We estimate the impact of reducing the EITC on mothers’ labor force participation 
using a combination of difference-in-differences and household fixed effects models, 
using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. The results indicate 
that some of those who most likely qualify for the EITC (unmarried, less educated 
mothers) leave the workforce when they lose the benefit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the largest U.S. federal cash-transfer pro-gram for low-income families. In 2013 alone, 28 million families received more 
than $66 billion.1 As of 2014, households could increase their gross incomes by up to 
45 percent depending on their eligibility qualifications,2 with $2,407 as the average 
amount of EITC received.3
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1 EITC Central, “EITC Information for the Press,” http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/press/.
2 Based on the structure of the program in 2014, single filers with three children with an earned income of 
$13,650 are eligible for the largest cash-transfer of $6,143.
3 EITC Central, “About EITC,” http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/abouteitc.
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In an effort to estimate the impact of the EITC program on labor force participation 
(LFP), many studies have set up natural experiments centered around EITC expansions 
(Cancian and Levinson, 2006; Dickert, Houser, and Scholz, 1995; Eissa and Hoynes, 
2004, 2006; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz, 2002; Meyer and 
Rosenbaum, 2001; Meyer, 2002; Scholz, 1994, 1996).4 To extend this discussion, we 
approach the issue from a different angle. Namely, we examine the effect of EITC 
reduction on LFP when households lose eligibility based on the qualifying child 
requirement.5 Rather than focusing on entry or expansion of the program, we exploit 
variation in the EITC based on exit. To estimate this effect, we exploit within house-
hold variation. Our results imply that some of those who most likely qualify for the 
EITC (unmarried, less educated mothers) leave the workforce when the EITC benefit 
stops. 
The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, this paper offers a new approach 
to examine the effects of income and wage variation on LFP. More specifically, this 
design presents an opportunity to examine whether the impacts of the program extend 
beyond the credit itself. As explicitly stated by the Internal Revenue Service, Congress 
originally approved the tax credit legislation in 1975 to increase incentives to work.6 
Considerable research has exploited variation in terms of EITC expansion to examine 
a series of short run impacts of the program; however, we have not seen any studies 
that examine whether the program has a lasting effect and adjusts one’s taste for work. 
While the explicit intention of the program is designed to incentivize work, arguably 
the implicit intention of this anti-poverty social program is that participants remain 
engaged in the workforce beyond their tenure of eligibility. By estimating the effect of 
LFP when the size of the credit decreases and ultimately stops, we examine the after 
effects of the EITC program on workforce activity.
Second, we offer an alternative empirical approach for this literature. A large portion 
of the EITC literature has employed between-group comparisons, specifically difference-
in-differences (DD) research designs (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Eissa and Liebman, 
1996; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014; Hotz and Scholz, 2006; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 
2001). These analyses centrally rest on the composition of a sufficient control group 
and an exogenous policy shock. Although these previous studies have presented robust 
estimates, the methodological hurdles inherent in this research design are open to criti-
cism, given the threat of selection bias for the control group. To strengthen the validity of 
this approach, we build upon this common design by including household fixed effects. 
Drawing from the literature, we identify the treatment and control groups based on edu-
cational attainment and marital status. With this approach we estimate the differential 
4 EITC program expansions took place in 1986, 1990, 1993, 2001, and 2009.
5 We use the terms “eligible” and “qualifying” interchangeably in the text.
6 EITC Tax Preparer Toolkit, “Handling the Most Common Error,” https://www.eitc.irs.gov/Tax-Preparer-
Toolkit/toosandtips/mostcommonerrors.
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effect of the EITC on labor supply by comparing activities within households rather 
than solely comparing differences between groups (e.g., mothers versus non-mothers). 
We use the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79) to examine the after effect of the EITC program on the labor supply 
of households who lose the tax credit due to children who passed the EITC qualifying 
child eligibility age threshold.7 This empirical approach allows us to examine the impact 
of the program for an older and often overlooked cohort of mothers who have children 
entering adulthood. We recognize that this approach has its own shortcomings. Given 
the structure of the program, the loss of eligibility is not random but rather predictable 
and depends on household choices. We aim to overcome this challenge not only by 
including a control group but also by accounting for household fixed effects that capture 
time-invariant factors that confound labor supply choices.
We find evidence suggesting that EITC reduction and exit decrease LFP. Most notably, 
losing one qualifying child decreases LFP by 3.3 percentage points, relative to house-
holds eligible for the EITC program. When comparing those most likely to be eligible 
for the EITC — unmarried, less educated mothers — to a control group of college 
educated unmarried mothers, the effect is larger with an 8.0 percentage point decrease. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II overviews the policy context for the 
EITC program and places this particular approach — focusing on EITC exit rather than 
program expansion — within the larger literature. Section III outlines the research design, 
data, sample, and stratification, and addresses concerns pertaining to identification. 
Section IV presents our research methods. Section V presents the results and includes 
additional specifications. Section VI discusses the results, considers these findings within 
the context of previous research, and offers directions for future research.
II. EITC POLICY CONTEXT AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE
The EITC program is a refundable federal income tax credit designed for households 
with low to moderate incomes. This anti-poverty measure is designed to incentivize 
work and offers a refundable tax credit to households that meet income and structure 
requirements. Households with income approximately under 125 percent of the federal 
poverty level qualify. The primary target population and large majority of recipients for 
this credit are single filer, low-income earners with qualifying children. As specified by 
the program, qualifying children must meet a series of age, relationship, and residency 
tests.8 Dependent children qualify until they turn age 19. If the dependent child is 
enrolled full time in college, the child qualifies until age 24. The program also provides 
modest support for a much smaller portion of very-low-income earners who do not have 
7 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “The NLSY79,” http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm.
8 Dependents with qualifying disabilities are not subject to an age requirement.
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a qualifying child.9 However, we follow the literature and focus on the former group — 
unmarried mothers in particular — who face both income and household requirements. 
The design of the credit follows a pyramid schedule, which includes a phase-in and 
phase-out region.10 The credit phases in at a fixed percentage from the first dollar of 
earned income until it reaches a maximum. The maximum credit is constant for an 
income range, and then the credit phases out at a smaller fixed percentage until the 
household income reaches a cap (Figure 1). The size of the credit depends on whether 
the household has a single filer or is a married couple filing jointly, as well as on the 
number of qualifying children. It is worth noting that after 2008 the program differenti-
ated among households with one, two, and three or more children. The recent expansion 
that includes a third eligible child effectively increased the maximum size of the credit 
by roughly 12.5 percent.11 
Given the design of the program, research directed toward LFP is prominent in the 
literature. In their literature review, Hotz and Scholz (2003) highlight three trends. 
First, the EITC program positively affects labor supply along the extensive margin 
for unmarried households — unmarried mothers in particular (Dickert, Houser, and 
Scholz, 1995; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004, 2006; Ellwood, 2000; Hotz and Scholz, 2003; 
Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Rothstein, 2005). In their evaluation of the program’s 
1986 expansion comparing unmarried mothers to a control group of unmarried women 
without children, Eissa and Liebman (1996) found an increase in LFP of 6.1 percent-
age points. Employing a similar research design, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) 
compared the effect of the EITC program to federal welfare programs and found that 
the EITC accounted for 60 percent of the increase in LFP, with smaller shares of the 
increase due to economic growth, welfare benefit reductions, waivers, and childcare 
expenses. 
Second, given that the design of the program is predicated on the earnings of the 
household, for married households, there is evidence that the EITC has a modest and 
 9 Given that the credit is a proportion of the household’s eligible earnings, the size of the credit for this 
population is notably smaller. In 2014, the maximum size of the credit for households without qualify-
ing children was $496, while households with 1, 2, and 3 or more children received $3,305, $5,460, and 
$6,143, respectively. The credit rate for childless households was 7.65 percent compared to 34, 40, and 
45 percent for the latter household structures (Tax Policy Center, “Taxation and the Family: What is the 
Earned Income Tax Credit?” http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.
cfm). In addition, on average, households without children who are eligible for the EITC earn roughly 
60 percent less than those eligible households with eligible children (Internal Revenue Service, “Earned 
Income Credit (EIC),” publication 596).
10 The program has undergone a number of expansions; the Tax Policy Center offers updated information 
on the size of the program (Tax Policy Center, “Taxation and the Family: What is the Earned Income Tax 
Credit,” http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm).
11 This  maximum credit for unmarried filers with two children in 2010 was $5,460, while the maximum credit 
for unmarried filers with three children in 2010 was $6,143 (Tax Policy Center, “Taxation and the Fam-
ily: What is the Earned Income Tax Credit,” http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/
family/eitc.cfm).
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even negative effect for secondary workers. Scholars attribute this effect to the different 
set of incentives regarding labor activity for the married population. Using a research 
design similar to Eissa and Liebman (1996), who compared eligible married couples 
with children to ineligible married couples without children, Eissa and Hoynes (2004) 
found that the EITC expansions reduced household labor supply. For households with 
income near the upper bound of the EITC income threshold, evidence suggests that 
the EITC program may effectively be subsidizing the secondary earners to stay out of 
the workforce. 
Third, results from analyses on the intensive margin for both married and unmarried 
households are ambiguous (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Hotz 
and Scholz, 2003). Only a small number of papers have examined the impact of the 
EITC on weeks worked, given that this estimation strategy poses greater empirical 
challenges. Not only do researchers find it difficult to deal with the selection of indi-
viduals into the labor force, but they also find it hard to identify the empirical change 
in the number of weeks worked, given the difficulty of modifying weeks worked and 
the aggregated comparison of means approach typically used (Eissa and Hoynes, 
2006). 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the impact of the EITC program on LFP 
has a heterogeneous treatment effect that depends on the structure of the qualifying 
household. These studies share not only a dependent variable — labor activity — but 
also an empirical approach exploiting EITC expansions to examine the short-run impact 
of the program. The validity of this design rests on the assumption that the expansion 
is unanticipated for the recipient household and is therefore plausibly exogenous. To 
strengthen the design, many studies use a control group that is ineligible for the EITC 
program as a reference group. 
This approach is subject to two criticisms. First, researchers are limited to exploiting 
legislative expansions in the program — 1986, 1990, 1993, 2001, and 2009 — with 
the majority of studies focused on the first three. Second, the validity of a DD design 
hinges on the identification of a defensible control group. Studies analyzing the most 
prominent target population — less educated, unmarried mothers — typically rely on 
unmarried women without children as the control group. Despite efforts to match on 
observable measures, this approach has methodological shortcomings. Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999) stress that women without children participate in the workforce closer 
to their upper bound compared to unmarried mothers since women without children 
do not have child-rearing constraints. Moreover, Ellwood (2000, p. 1074) highlights 
that “the temporal trends in labor force participation of the women with and without 
children are often different before the enactment of the EITC, so drawing inferences 
from differential trends afterwards is troubling.” 
We do not intend to discount these studies; rather, we aim to extend the discussion 
with an empirical approach that considers the after effects of the program. We exploit 
variation in the size of the credit when a household loses eligibility because qualify-
ing children age out of the program. While we examine the short-run effect of EITC 
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reduction, this offers a framework for assessing if the primary goal of the program 
— incentivizing work — extends beyond the tenure of the program. We focus this 
study on one of the largest groups of EITC recipients — unmarried, less educated 
mothers — where the literature has found the program to increase LFP (Dickert, 
Houser, and Scholz, 1995; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004, 2006; Ellwood, 2000; Meyer 
and Rosenbaum, 2001; Rothstein, 2005). Given that households can be eligible for 
this credit for up to 18 years (or even longer for households with multiple children or 
with children that attend college) we expect that the extended tenure of the credit may 
have a lasting effect for the treatment group in terms of adjusting the filers’ taste for 
work.12 
Our research design circumvents the two criticisms highlighted above. First, by 
focusing on the loss of EITC eligibility, our empirical approach is not constrained to 
examine programmatic change. This approach allows for a more recent assessment of 
the program by looking at labor activity from 1996 to 2010, which includes but is not 
limited to the most recent major expansions in 2001 and 2009. Moreover, by exploiting 
household variation in the size of the EITC over time, we can include household fixed 
effects to control for unobserved time-invariant factors.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
This study focuses on the effect of EITC reduction on LFP. We exploit variation 
in the size of the credit based on the qualifying child requirement, specifically when 
qualifying children age out of the program. This scenario occurs when a household’s 
second youngest and then youngest child turn age 19, respectively.13 If the children are 
enrolled full time in college, program eligibility extends until the child turns age 24. 
We note that loss of eligibility is not random and depends both on household choices 
and EITC program design. Thus, we draw from a series of life-cycle labor supply stud-
ies that rely on exogenous and anticipated tax changes contingent on the household 
requirement to justify this approach (Feldman, Katuscak, and Kawano, 2016; Looney 
and Singhal, 2006; Mulligan, 1999). 
This section is organized as follows. We begin by presenting the data and sample. 
Next, we identify the targeted treated population. Then, we discuss plausible design 
threats to the empirical approach. Critical to this design is the assumption that changes 
in LFP are only attributed to EITC reduction for households with the second youngest 
and youngest child losing eligibility, respectively. 
12 Dowd and Horowitz (2011) find evidence that households claim EITC at varying rates; however, as we 
expect, low-income households — with unmarried mothers in particular — demonstrate longer periods 
of use compared to other households.
13 After 2009, the EITC program created a differential benefit for families with three or more eligible children. 
We focus on two eligible children given that our time frame ranges from 1996 to 2010. Moreover, there 
were very few households with three eligible children in 2010.
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A. Data and Sample
We use the NLSY79 dataset, a national survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.14 Given the household requirement for the EITC program, this is a particu-
larly useful data source to examine the effect of EITC reduction and/or exit on labor 
activity. The survey initially used multiple respondent households where all eligible 
individuals age 14 to 21 in the household at the end of 1978 were included as individual 
respondents.15 After the initial survey in 1979, individuals were interviewed about them-
selves and their family members annually until 1994, and biennially thereafter with all 
time-varying questions referring to the previous calendar year. We use the more recent 
data from 1996 to 2010. The NLSY79 oversamples civilian blacks, Hispanics, and 
the economically disadvantaged non-black/non-Hispanic population. This is a useful 
population for our analysis, given that it targets households more likely eligible for the 
EITC. 
We rely on the sample of households with one to four children between ages 6 to 
33. We selected this specific population of households for a number of reasons. First, 
our identification strategy focuses on households with children. Second, we exclude 
households with more than four children to maintain a relatively homogenous household 
structure. Labor decisions are likely different among larger households; in addition, 
households with five or more children are outliers in our sample.16 Third, we exclude 
observations for respondents with any children under age 6 due to the expected addi-
tional time constraints of having young children (Gelbach, 2002).17 Moreover, we 
extend the age cutoff to 30 for the youngest child and to 33 for older siblings for the 
following reasons: 18 (1) to capture eligibility changes at age 19 (or 24, assuming col-
lege enrollment applies); (2) to include observations in the post-treatment period; and 
(3) to exclude mothers post-retirement. While children with disabilities qualify for the 
14 In 1979 the NLSY79 surveyed 12,686 men and women between the age 14 to 22 in three subsamples. The 
largest group was comprised of 6,111 individuals representative of the U.S. non-institutionalized civilian 
youth population, the second consisted of 5,295 individuals with an oversample of civilian Hispanic, black, 
and economically disadvantaged non-black/non-Hispanic youths, and the third surveyed 1,280 military 
youths enlisted in the armed forces.
15 Respondents were then interviewed each survey year with information collected on their current spouse 
and children. Information on other individuals in the family unit after the base year survey is recorded 
under the respondent’s identification number, not as a separate record. While most of the households with 
multiple respondents were comprised of siblings, there were also 334 respondents that were spouses in 
the same household.
16 Ninety-five percent of married and 93 percent of unmarried households with children have four or less 
children, respectively. 
17 The minimum requirement for primary school varies across state; the average age of enrollment is age 6 
(National Center for Education Statistics, “Table 5.3 Types of State and District Requirements for Kinder-
garten Entrance and Attendance, by State: 2014,” http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_3.asp).
18 We considered extending the age cutoff beyond age 33; however, the distribution of children’s ages trails 
off at this point. We excluded those older than age 33 given that they are outliers to the sample. 
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program regardless of age, the NLSY79 does not have information on disability status. 
Thus, our measure of eligibility has some measurement error, which may attenuate the 
estimates. 
B. Selection of Treatment Group
Considerable scholarly and policy attention has been placed on a specific population 
of recipients — unmarried, less educated mothers. Not only are they the most relevant 
group for studying whether the EITC reduces welfare dependency, but unmarried 
mothers are also the group for which we can most plausibly ignore the joint labor 
supply decisions of other family members and accordingly derive simple predictions 
from labor supply theory (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). We follow the literature and 
identify eligible households with unmarried, less educated mothers. We operationalize 
this by stratifying the head of household filer by gender, filing status, and education. 
Recent research has found little empirical evidence that the EITC has altered marriage 
or family formation rates (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 2003, 2009; Dickert-Conlin 
and Houser, 2002; Eissa and Hoynes, 1998; Ellwood, 2000; Evans and Garthwaite, 
2014). Therefore, we are not concerned about selection into treatment — in terms of 
EITC eligibility — across this dimension. 
We stratify by educational attainment to provide a proxy for the EITC income eligi-
bility, since stratifying by contemporaneous income is endogenous with our dependent 
variable, LFP. Specifically, we stratify by the head of household’s modal value of edu-
cation over the 1996 to 2010 time frame.19 Earlier EITC research stratified by less than 
a high school education to identify the eligible population (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006; 
Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001); however, more recent studies 
have increased the education threshold to high school or equivalent (Averett and Wang, 
2013; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014). In earlier iterations of this work, we stratified by 
both characteristics and found robust results. However, we present the results from the 
more inclusive stratification to follow the more recent scholarship. 
Figure 1 shows a kernel density of the income distribution for unmarried mothers 
stratified by educational attainment ranging from less than high school to college. This 
figure offers convincing evidence that EITC eligibility is inversely related to educational 
attainment. To be clear, we do not directly measure EITC with this sample, but rather 
identify the sample most likely intended for treatment using education and household 
structure as a proxy for eligibility. Not surprisingly, the treatment effect is more diluted 
as the educational attainment increases; for instance, 85 percent of those with a high 
school education or less had earnings below the EITC maximum income threshold, while 
only 47 percent of those with a college education or more were below the threshold. 
In other words, unmarried mothers with a high school education or less comprise the 
purest EITC treatment group for this sample, leaving unmarried mothers with a college 
19 In the event the head of household has two modal values, we selected the lower level of attainment. Only 
4 percent of women in the sample changed their education category during the 1996 to 2010 time period. 
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education as the most defensible control for unmarried mothers.20 We recognize that this 
comparison is imperfect, yet the structure of the household is similar. We strengthen 
this design with the inclusion of household fixed effects.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for unmarried mothers. Again, these unmarried 
mothers have one to four children between ages 6 to 33. To approximate the treatment 
and control groups, we stratify by education in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. LFP is 
the primary outcome; this measure is derived from the respondents’ reported number of 
weeks worked in the previous calendar year as one if a respondent worked any weeks and 
Notes: Kernel density of household earned income in 2010($) for unmarried women is stratified 
by educational status. The window is $1 to $50,000. EITCs for one- and two-children families in 
2010 are shown in thick lines. The smaller and taller trapezoids refer to families with one and 
two children, respectively.
Source: NLSY79 1996–2010 — unmarried mothers
Figure 1
Income by Educational Attainment for Unmarried Mothers
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zero otherwise. We report a series of household characteristics for illustrative purposes, 
given that many of these characteristics are time-invariant and therefore incorporated 
into the model with the household fixed effects. 
C. Identification 
The strength of this research design lies in the following assumption: the head of 
household’s LFP is solely a function of EITC reduction as approximated by the second 
youngest and/or youngest eligible child aging out of the program. In other words, we 
assume that LFP is not a function of potential contemporaneous factors that result from 
the qualifying children aging from 18 to 19 (or, in the case of those children enrolled 
full time in college, aging from 23 to 24). Critics to this design may be concerned that 
children aging from 18 to 19, who are at a time in their life that shortly follows high 
school graduation, affect the head of household’s LFP. To justify this approach, we rely 
on a series of diagnostic tests and draw from the literature. 
Table 1
Summary Statistics
 (1)  (2)
≤ High School ≥ College
Labor force participation 0.77 (0.42)  0.93 (0.26)
Income (mean $) 18,003 (22,173) 40,375 (38,969)
Income (median $) 13,165 34,000
Mother’s age 42.49 (5.13) 43.72 (5.06)
Black 0.47 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50)
Hispanic 0.21 (0.41) 0.12 (0.33)
AFDC 0.07 (0.25) 0.02 (0.15)
Food stamps 0.20 (0.40) 0.05 (0.21)
Child 1 college 0.23 (0.42) 0.65 (0.48)
Child 2 college 0.17 (0.38) 0.48 (0.50)
Child 3 college 0.13 (0.34) 0.57 (0.50)
Child 4 college 0.06 (0.25)  0.80 (0.45)
N 5,639   1,162  
Unique N 1,423   307  
Notes: Summary statistics are stratified by education attainment. Child 1 college corresponds to the pro-
portion of oldest children attending college between age 18 to 25. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Source: NLSY79 1996–2010 — unmarried mothers
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In terms of mechanisms, one may be concerned that unmarried mothers may retire 
when their children complete high school, given that these women represent an older 
workforce cohort. The average age for the entire sample, however, is 42.7, and the 
average age when the youngest child becomes ineligible for the EITC is 46 with the 
99th percentile at age 53. Thus, we have little concern that aging into conventional retire-
ment ages affects our estimates. We recognize, though, that intertemporal substitution 
may confound the results, as women may be more likely to change careers after their 
children graduate. Nevertheless, the binary design of the outcome metric obviates this.21 
From another angle, some may be concerned that women are more likely to enter 
the workforce when their children complete high school given that they have fewer 
household responsibilities. To examine this phenomenon, we compare LFP rates for 
unmarried mothers with less education with children aging from 18 to 19. We focus on 
age variation for their children who are not the second youngest or youngest — spe-
cifically, we consider the age transition of the oldest child in households with three to 
six dependents. Importantly, these children do not affect EITC eligibility, yet their age 
poses a plausibly comparable impact on the household in terms of potential changes to 
household structure. This approach serves as a falsification test for our identification 
strategy. Results from a comparison of means tests indicate that the average rates of LFP 
for women with children age 18 as compared to children age 19 are slightly different 
(0.001), but the difference is not statistically different from zero. We argue that these 
null results offer preliminary evidence that the head of household’s labor decisions are 
not a function of the fact that their children from age 18 to 19, and therefore age varia-
tion of the second youngest and youngest child is an appropriate estimate for EITC 
variation and income reduction. Exploiting this particular variation on the treatment 
group is our closest approximation to the counter-factual.22 
A number of studies that have employed methods similar to ours offer convincing 
evidence that parental labor supply does not change as children enter adulthood (Feld-
man, Kawano, and Katuscak, 2016; Looney and Singhal, 2006; Mulligan, 1999). For 
example, in estimating life cycle effects for families who lose AFDC eligibility, Mulligan 
(1999) justifies the use of a “qualifying child” indicator by arguing that the 18th birthday 
of the youngest child is not associated with changes in health, “tastes,” productivity, or 
other variables for the parents. Although the 18th birthday is one year before the EITC 
eligibility cutoff, we would suspect that, if there were to be a life event effect, it would 
be more pronounced at age 18 rather than age 19 given that legal status changes at this 
21 To reiterate, the metric is coded one if the mother worked any weeks in a given year. If the mother was 
changing careers when her child turned age 19 and therefore was out of the labor force, we would only be 
able to track this change if she were unemployed for more than one calendar year. At that point, we argue 
it is sufficient to assume she is out of the labor force.
22 With this approach, there are still at least two children in the house. So while we exploit within varia-
tion for the treatment group, responses to LFP may be different for the younger children. To address this 
limitation, we also consider unmarried college educated mothers as a counter-factual. This control group 
is included in the DD model. These results are presented in the next two sections.
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cutoff. Nevertheless, Mulligan does not find evidence to support this. Looney and Singhal 
(2006) discuss the effect of intertemporal labor supply elasticities on life cycle labor 
supply activity. The authors consider the effect of EITC participation among married 
households by exploiting variation in program eligibility based on the qualifying child 
requirement. They rely on empirical evidence from a series of comparisons demonstrat-
ing that parental labor supply does not change for parents in control groups who are 
ineligible for the policy with children at the same age. As illustrated above, we follow 
this approach examining variation within eligible populations and find similar results. 
A related line of research focuses on the economic relationship between young adult 
children and their parents and has found consistency in family dynamics as children 
age into adulthood (Goldscheider, Thornton, and Yang, 2001). Aquilino (2005) found 
evidence to suggest that midlife parents continue to provide economic support to their 
children into the child’s early years of adulthood, though the commitment is greater 
among households with married parents. This study offers evidence that the family 
dynamics — specifically those that pertain to the demands of parental labor supply — 
remain unchanged as the child enters adulthood. 
Taken together, we argue that the factor of children aging from 18 to 19 alone does 
not change the head of household’s LFP. While we recognize that high school gradu-
ation is a notable life event for a child and his or her family, we do not find evidence 
that this event affects LFP for unmarried, less educated mothers. Thus, we argue that 
the variation in the youngest child’s age serves as a valid measure to assess the effect 
of a reduction in income on LFP. 
IV. METHODS
We estimate two sets of models to examine the effect of the EITC on LFP. The first 
is a household fixed effects model that exploits within household variation based on 
change in the child’s age. The second builds upon this model and incorporates a DD 
design to include a control group of ineligible unmarried mothers with a higher level 
of education. 
Equation (1) is a household fixed effects model estimating the impact of the number 
of EITC qualifying children on LFP. For this model, we restrict the sample to unmarried 
mothers with a high school education or less.
(1) α β β ε= + + + +Y ELIGIBLE ELIGIBLE Year1 2 .it i it it t it1 2
We control for general macroeconomic shocks to the labor market using survey year 
fixed effects, Yeart. The year fixed effects also capture the effect of aging on the respon-
dent’s LFP because age and year are collinear. We control for time-invariant household 
factors with household fixed effects, ai. The dependent variable, Yit, is the extensive 
margin of labor supply (LFP). 
Variation in the qualifying child’s eligibility based on age serves as our key inde-
pendent variable of interest. The age of each child was derived using the year of birth, 
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survey year, and, if applicable, year of death of each child. 1ELIGIBLEit is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 when the household has only one child between age 6 and 18, result-
ing in one qualifying child. 2ELIGIBLEit  is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the 
household has two or more children between age 6 and 18, resulting in two qualifying 
children for the EITC. The omitted category is when the household’s children are over 
age 18, resulting in no qualifying children. Thus, b2 estimates the effect of having two 
EITC qualifying children compared to zero and b1 estimates the effect of having one 
EITC qualifying child compared to zero. 
The EITC serves both to increase the wage and income of recipients. Theoretically, the 
reduction of the EITC from losing eligible children lowers the wage leading to lower LFP 
due to a lower cost of leisure (substitution effect). Yet the EITC reduction also lowers 
income that could lead to higher LFP to counteract the reduction in income. While both 
effects are likely at play, the income effect may not be as dominant if households can 
recover this loss by other means — such as other public assistance programs, including 
the TANF/AFDC program for eligible households.23
Most papers investigating EITC find an increase in female LFP when the household 
experiences an increase in the generosity of the credit from a program expansion (e.g., 
Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). If 
the response is also similar when using time varying, within household variation in 
the reduction of the credit, then we expect the absolute value of the coefficient b2 to 
be larger than the coefficient b1 because the EITC is larger for two qualifying children 
than one. The marginal effect between two and one eligible children can be calculated 
by the difference between b2  and b1. To operationalize this, we use two binary variables 
to account for qualifying children as opposed to a variable of number of qualifying 
children.24 The latter implies a linear relationship, which is not appropriate in this case 
given the non-linear rates of EITC for income by number of eligible children.25 
Equation (2) is a hybrid model including a DD and household fixed effects.26 We 
stratify on education to determine the treatment and control groups. Unmarried moth-
ers with a high school education or less serve as the treatment group and, based on the 
results from the kernel density of income distribution (Figure 1), unmarried mothers 
with a college education serve as the control. The sample for this model therefore is 
23 Family and Social Services Administration, “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,” http://www.
in.gov/fssa/dfr/2684.htm. See also Maag, Rennane, and Steurele (2011) for a useful overview of social 
programs for children.
24 We have also used a single indicator variable equal to one for any eligible children and get similar estimates.
25 There is a large difference in the amount of the credit between a household with no children and a house-
hold with one child, and a smaller increase when going from one to two children. In 2009, the EITC was 
expanded to include a small increase from two to three children. See Internal Revenue Service, “2015 
EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit Amounts and Tax Law Updates,” http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/
EITC-Income-Limits,-Maximum-Credit--Amounts-and-Tax-Law-Updates for more information on the 
EITC.
26 This hybrid model may also be referred to as a triple differences model with one treatment dimension 
being education and the other the number of eligible children.
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larger. To distinguish clearly between the treatment and control groups, we exclude the 
sample of recipients with some college education.
(2) α β β β= + + + ≤Y ELIGIBLE ELIGIBLE EDUCATION ELIGIBLE1 2 ( 12)(1 )it i it it it1 2 3
   β ε+ ≤ + +EDUCATION ELIGIBLE Year( 12)(2 ) .it t it4
The outcome variable (Yit), household fixed effects (ai), and year dummies (Yeart) 
estimate components similar to those in (1). Moreover, the estimation approach of the 
qualifying children — for one and two — is similar with b1 and b2 in (1) reflecting the 
estimated differences in LFP for one and two qualifying children, respectively, compared 
to zero, but now for the control group. The coefficient for (FemaleED≤12)(1ELIGIBLEit), 
b3, estimates how much further the outcome for the treatment group (high school or less) 
deviates from zero qualifying children compared to the control group’s deviation; b4 
 
estimates this same deviation for the treatment group with two qualifying children. The 
parameters of interest are estimated by b3 and b4, which measure the change in LFP due 
to variation in EITC eligibility for the treatment group compared to the control group. 
We include both models given their unique yet complementary attributes. The house-
hold fixed effects model explicitly exploits within household variation. Following the 
EITC literature, we also include the hybrid model; this places the results in context 
to a control group. We suspect the true effect of EITC reduction is bracketed by these 
two estimations.
For both models, we employ a Linear Probability Model (LPM). This approach is 
used instead of a logit model due to our use of a fixed effects model and the ease of 
interpreting marginal effects; additionally out-of-range predictions do not pose an 
empirical concern with this analysis.27 The standard errors are clustered at the household 
level. The sample size ranges from 1,421 to 1,730 unique heads of household for the 
main results; this depends on the stratification employed and model. 
V. RESULTS
A. Household Fixed Effects Estimates 
The results from Column 1 of Panel A in Table 2 report the estimated coefficients for 
(1). The results for the qualifying children — one and two — are positive, though only 
statistically significant for the former. The statistically significant results indicate that 
losing one EITC qualifying child decreases LFP by 3.3 percentage points compared to 
households with no qualifying children.28
27 There were no out-of-range predictions using the LPM model.
28 Note that, given that we rely on EITC reduction, we interpret the LFP results in a manner that may seem 
opposite to the coefficients in the tables.
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Table 2
Main Results
 (1) (2)
Child Eligible Until Age: 19 24
Panel A. Fixed Effects Model (Equation 1)
1ELIGIBLE 0.033* 0.045**
(0.018) (0.020)
2ELIGIBLE 0.028 0.047*
(0.025) (0.026)
N 5,639 5,624
Unique N 1,423 1,421
Panel B. Hybrid – DD and Fixed Effects Model (Equation 2)
(EDUCATION ≤ 12) × (1ELIGIBLE) 0.080*** 0.089**
(0.023) (0.036)
(EDUCATION ≤ 12) × (2ELIGIBLE) 0.105*** 0.202***
(0.031) (0.041)
1ELIGIBLE –0.039** –0.039
(0.020) (0.032)
2ELIGIBLE –0.065** –0.144***
(0.029) (0.039)
N 6,801 6,786
Unique N 1,730 1,728
Notes: Estimates are included in Column 1 assuming a child is eligible until age 19 or age 24 in Col-
umn 2. Panel A includes estimates from a household fixed effects model (1), including indicators for 
number of qualifying children (less than age 19 or age 24) and survey year for single mothers with a 
high school education or less. Panel B estimates (2); this includes interactions between the numbers 
of qualifying children and an indicator for whether the respondent was in the treatment group (had a 
high school education or less). Unmarried mothers with at least a college education serve as the control 
group in Panel B. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. Asterisks denote 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Source: NLSY79 1996–2010 — unmarried mothers
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B. Hybrid DD Household Fixed Effects Estimates 
Column 1 of Panel B in Table 2 reports the coefficients for (2). The sample for this 
model is larger and includes the control group of unmarried, college educated mothers. 
In contrast to (1), this model exploits a pre- and post-comparison group design. The coef-
ficients for the treatment group are positive and statistically significant for both one and 
two qualifying children. The differential effect of EITC reduction, due to the youngest 
child aging out of the program, is an average decrease in LFP of a statistically significant 
8 percentage points. Moreover, the differential effect of EITC reduction, due to the loss of 
two qualifying children, is associated with a decrease of 10.5 percentage points. Both of 
these results are compared to those less likely to be eligible for the program. We estimate 
the loss of two qualifying children as a preliminary step to derive the marginal impact 
of EITC reduction when the second youngest child ages out, yet the household remains 
eligible for a smaller credit. The difference between the coefficients for two and one eli-
gible children, however, is not statistically significant. The estimates for the control group 
are the opposite sign and relatively smaller; however, they are statistically significant. 
C. Additional Specifications
We examine the impact of variation in the number of EITC qualifying children 
across two dimensions as additional specification measures. First, we assess variation 
in the timing of the shock to account for families whose children attend college, thus 
extending the benefit period. Second, we stratify by household structure — in terms 
of the number of children — to see if there is a heterogeneous treatment effect across 
households with one, two, three, or four children, respectively, for unmarried mothers 
with a high school education or less. 
1. College Attendance
Thus far, the empirical analysis has ignored the possibility of college attendance pro-
longing the household’s EITC eligibility until the child turns age 24. Treating households 
with children enrolled in college past age 18 as if they have lost their EITC eligibility 
would attenuate the estimates toward zero since these parents would still be receiving 
the EITC and would theoretically have no need to adjust their LFP. 
We adjust our assumption and extend EITC eligibility to age 23. While we do have 
self-reported data on college attendance for dependent children, we want to account for 
families that may be misled by the form or choose incorrectly to extend their benefit. 
Thus, we apply the extended cutoff to the full sample (Chetty and Saez, 2013).29 Col-
umn 2 in Table 2 reports the results for (1) (Panel A) and (2) (Panel B), respectively. 
29 While Chetty and Saez (2013) did not explicitly focus on the requirement, results from their randomized 
experiment of 43,000 EITC recipients suggest that tax preparers can influence how recipients file for the 
credit. No additional enrollment information is needed for the filer to extend the credit from age 18 to 23; 
the filer simply needs to check a box that the dependent is less than age 24 and is a student. For instance, see 
Box 4a of the 2006 EIC form (www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040sei--2006.pdf). The form has not changed 
over the course of our sample (for the 1998 form, see www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040sei--1998.pdf) and 
is very similar to the form used in 2014 (www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sei.pdf).
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The result for one qualifying child is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that LFP decreases by 4.5 percentage points when the youngest child loses eligibility. 
The differential effect of EITC reduction on LFP due to the loss of two qualifying 
children is associated with a decrease of 4.7 percentage points. The difference between 
these two coefficients is not statistically significant. 
In Column 2 of Panel B in Table 2, we present the coefficients for (2). The coefficients 
for the treatment group are robustly positive and significant with an estimated decrease 
in LFP by 8.9 and 20.2 percentage points, respectively, for the loss of one and two 
qualifying children. For the control group, the coefficients are the opposite sign and are 
statistically significant for the two qualifying children. Just as with the age 19 cutoff, 
we recognize that this control group — while the most appropriate when considering 
income — is still not a clean control group since some of the respondents are eligible 
for the EITC, and this group is not as comparable to less educated households. 
2. Household Size Stratification
The results in Panel A of Table 3 report the coefficients for (1) for unmarried moth-
ers with a high school education or less stratified by the number of children.30 The 
sample size ranges from 170 to 529. We interpret the results with caution given the 
small sample size, especially for one-, three-, and four-children stratifications. The 
results point to a potential heterogeneous treatment effect by household structure. 
Notably, the coefficients are not significant for households with one, three, or four 
children. For households with two children, the results are positive and statistically 
significant such that losing one EITC qualifying child decreases LFP by 7 percent-
age points, and losing two EITC qualifying children decreases LFP by 8.1 percentage 
points. 
For households with three or four children, the direction of the coefficient is posi-
tive, but the size is notably smaller and not significant. We argue that these households 
have a different set of tradeoffs than households with one or two children since they are 
more likely income constrained (see average and median incomes at the top of Table 
3). These lower incomes suggest that these families are potentially eligible for AFDC/
TANF benefits and are deciding between not working and receiving AFDC/TANF 
versus working and receiving the EITC. Given these tradeoffs, we suspect the results 
are noisier for these larger families. 
Regarding households with one child, there is evidence to suggest that these children 
have a higher college attendance rate and therefore could remain eligible for the credit 
until they turn age 24.31 Thus, it is more likely that for one-child families the EITC 
credit is extended to the college cutoff at age 24 so we would expect to see the effect 
from the loss of the credit at this later age as opposed to age 19.
30 We also run (2) stratified by household size and find similar results; these results are presented in Table 
A1.
31 Approximately, one-third of children in one-child households in the treatment group attend college, which 
is roughly twice the proportion of those in two- to four-child households. The proportion attending college 
falls with family size.
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The results in Panel B of Table 3 extend the eligibility cutoff to age 24 and present 
the coefficients from (1). The result is positive and statistically significant for house-
holds with one child, indicating that losing the qualifying child decreases LFP by 6.9 
percentage points. This supports our expectation, as these children are more likely to 
attend college and therefore are eligible for the extended credit. The coefficients are 
negative though not significant for households with two children. For households with 
three or four children, the coefficients are positive, yet the result is only significant for 
households with three children for the two qualifying children. Notably, losing two 
EITC qualifying children decreases LFP by 10.8 percentage points for households 
with three children.
Table 3
Fixed Effects Model Stratified by Number of Children
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Child 2 Children 3 Children 4 Children
Income (mean $) 18,956 20,301 16,032 12,967
Income (median $) 15,000 16,000 10,000 5,000
Panel A. Child Eligible until Age 19 (Equation 1)
1ELIGIBLE –0.030 0.070*** 0.039 0.043
(0.038) (0.027) (0.033) (0.062)
2ELIGIBLE 0.081** 0.027 0.027
(0.038) (0.051) (0.072)
N 1,360 2,133 1,569 642
Unique N 352 529 378 170
Panel B. Child Eligible until Age 24 (Equation 1)
1ELIGIBLE 0.069** –0.003 0.06 0.085
(0.03) (0.03) (0.042) (0.103)
2ELIGIBLE –0.038 0.108** 0.119
(0.039) (0.05) (0.114)
N 1,360 2,133 1,554 642
Unique N 352 529 376 170
Notes: Estimates are for those with high school education or less and are stratified by total number of 
children. The estimates are from a household fixed effects model (1) including indicators for number 
of qualifying children (less than age 19  — Panel A — or less than age 24 — Panel B) and survey 
year. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Source: NLSY79 1996–2010 — unmarried mothers 
The Effect of Reducing the Earned Income Tax Credit 279
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This analysis expands the EITC literature by focusing on EITC reduction and exit. 
Considerable research has exploited variation in terms of EITC expansion; however, 
we examine whether the program has a lasting effect and adjusts one’s taste for work. 
While the explicit intention of the program is to incentivize work, the implicit intention 
of this anti-poverty social program is that participants remain engaged in the workforce 
beyond their tenure of eligibility. We examine the after effects of the EITC program on 
workforce activity and identify unmarried, less educated mothers as our target treat-
ment group. This approach complements the existing literature not only by focusing on 
a different policy dimension but also by considering the impact of the program for an 
older cohort of mothers with children entering adulthood. The household fixed effects 
and hybrid model with a DD research designs provide alternative robust approaches to 
studying the effects of this popular assistance program in a way that minimizes bias. 
We find evidence suggesting that when children age out of EITC eligibility, some 
recipients leave the labor force. Specifically, losing one qualifying child decreases LFP 
by 3.3 percentage points. When comparing the treatment group to the control group of 
college educated, unmarried mothers, the effect is larger with an 8.0 percentage point 
decrease. We would like to note that our hybrid model (2) does in fact produce a larger 
effect than the fixed effect estimator. This suggests that unmarried, college educated 
mothers in fact increase their LFP when their child turns age 19. While prior studies 
have found that the EITC program is successful in promoting work, these results sug-
gest that the labor supply for the intended treatment group responds to the removal of 
the incentive. This result also holds when we place the within household variation in 
contrast to an ineligible control group. 
We include a series of additional specifications to assess whether there is a heteroge-
neous treatment effect with respect to household size. In addition, we assess variation in 
the timing of the shock to account for families whose children may attend college, thus 
extending the benefit period. For the former, we find that households with two children 
drive the effect when eligibility is contingent on the age 19 cutoff. This group is not only 
eligible to receive the largest share of the EITC but also accounts for the largest type of 
family structure in terms of the number of children. Thus, it is with a policy significant 
group that we find a statistically significant effect. As for the latter specification, we find 
evidence that the net effect is larger when we extend the credit to children turning age 
24. We suspect these households are more likely to claim dependents until age 23 to 
extend the credit, even though only a small portion note that their children are enrolled 
in college. While data on the filing details for the EITC are not publicly available, this 
would be worth exploring in future research and would complement a growing line of 
literature on tax credits and college enrollment (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff, 2011; 
Manoli and Turner, 2014). 
In addition, our limited findings for larger families may be indicative of an alternative 
set of tradeoffs. Families with three or four children have lower incomes on average, as 
compared to smaller families. This makes them potentially eligible for AFDC/TANF 
benefits. These families are making the trade off between some work and receiving the 
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EITC and no work and receiving AFDC/TANF throughout their child’s lifetime. Thus, 
their behavior is not comparable to smaller families.32 
While our results indicate that some people leave the workforce when the EITC 
benefit stops, it is important to note that not everyone does. Eissa and Liebman (1996) 
find that LFP increased 6.1 percentage points for unmarried, less educated mothers 
using the 1986 EITC expansion, which increased the maximum EITC credit from 
$550 to $851 or a difference of $598 in 2010 dollars. In this paper, the loss of the last 
remaining EITC qualifying child in 2010 for a family with the maximum credit was 
$3,050. In a hypothetical scenario, if EITC exit were to impact the recipients equally 
but in the opposite direction, then we would suspect the exit to decrease LFP by over 30 
percent.33 However, the largest effect we find is a decrease of 20.2 percent, with most 
results being much smaller. The difference implies that while the EITC fails to provide a 
taste for work for many women, it does for others, thereby increasing the labor force on 
net. 
This article opens up avenues for additional research in a number of dimensions. First, 
future research could examine how EITC reduction affects married households. More-
over, with improved data, additional studies could examine this effect at the intensive 
margin. Second, several studies examine the effects of the EITC on outcomes other than 
labor; these include health outcomes and spending patterns (Averett and Wang, 2013; 
Evans and Garthwaite, 2014; Barrow and McGranahan, 2000; Smeeding, Phillips, and 
O’Connor, 2000). Future studies could build upon our empirical approach by analyzing 
these alternative outcomes. Third, future research could focus on the mechanisms of 
EITC reduction and LFP — specifically in examining how these lower income families 
respond to incentives and tradeoffs. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) offer a baseline for 
this type of analysis, but more updated research is warranted. In addition, in looking 
at an older cohort of mothers, how might intergenerational households weigh these 
tradeoffs? Are the children of unmarried mothers now supporting them since they are 
older, or are the unmarried mothers perhaps caregivers to grandchildren? These issues 
deserve greater attention.
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Table A1
Hybrid Model Stratified by Number of Children
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
 1 Child 2 Children 3 Children 4 Children
Panel A. Child Eligible until Age 19 (Equation 2)
(EDUCATION ≤ 12) × (1ELIGIBLE) 0.058 0.134*** –0.026 0.089
(0.041) (0.035) (0.059) (0.116)
(EDUCATION ≤ 12) × (2ELIGIBLE) 0.150*** 0.056 0.027
(0.040) (0.072) (0.109)
1ELIGIBLE –0.066** –0.061** 0.065 –0.026
(0.031) (0.029) (0.052) (0.101)
2ELIGIBLE –0.064* –0.036 0.026
(0.035) (0.070) (0.120)
N 1,816 2,538 1,752 695
Unique N 463 650 428 189
Panel B. Child Eligible until Age 24 (Equation 2)
(EDUCATION ≤ 12) × (1ELIGIBLE) 0.104** 0.042 0.161 0.077
(0.048) (0.074) (0.124) (0.163)
(EDUCATION ≤ 12) × (2ELIGIBLE) 0.184*** 0.220** 0.290**
(0.064) (0.088) (0.114)
1ELIGIBLE –0.022 –0.035 –0.092 0.008
(0.042) (0.069) (0.117) (0.114)
2ELIGIBLE –0.201*** –0.109 –0.159***
(0.063) (0.083) (0.057)
N 1,816 2,538 1,737 695
Unique N 463 650 426 189
Notes: Estimates are for those with an education of high school or less and are stratified by number of 
children. Columns 1–4 denote one to four children, respectively. Estimates are from the hybrid DD, 
fixed effects model (2) that includes interactions between number of qualifying children and whether 
the respondent had education less than or equal to high school, with unmarried college serving as the 
control. Panel A considers children eligible until they turn age 19, while Panel B uses an age 24 cutoff. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. Asterisks denote significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Source: NLSY79 1996–2010 — unmarried mothers
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